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Abstract
What degree of tax autonomy should be granted to a regional government on
a local tax base? Although the regional policy maker aims at maximizing social
welfare, her tax policy may be distorted by the lobbying activity of local taxpayers.
In this political environment we characterize the conditions under which social
welfare can be increased by restricting the set of tax instruments available to the
local policy maker, i.e. the degree of local tax autonomy. We show that full tax
autonomy is likely to be dominated by minimal tax autonomy when there are many
groups of similar size, while the converse occurs when tax bases are asymmetrically
distributed.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
An important dimension of the design of a tax system concerns the allocation of the
taxing power to the various layers of government. If sub-national governments are to
enjoy some degree of ﬁscal autonomy, which is the essence of ﬁscal federalism, then they
need to be endowed with enough taxing power to ﬁnance their spending functions.1 A
large literature has focused on the ‘overall-budget’ ﬁscal autonomy of local governments,
that is the degree of autonomy they should be granted to aﬀect the two sides, revenues
and expenditures, of their budget.2 In this paper we focus instead on a diﬀerent
concept of autonomy that refers to the possibility of shaping tax schedules on own-
source revenues. In particular, we examine from a normative perspective whether it
is desirable to restrict the tax autonomy of a local government in its administration
of a local tax that serves both the ﬁnancing of a local public good and the pursuit of
equity objectives, given that political inﬂuence by the aﬀected taxpayers may distort
tax policy away from the one that would be chosen by a benevolent social planner.3
In our model, a local government is entitled to levy a tax on an immobile local
tax base that is positively correlated with the net income of taxpayers.4 Taxation is
restricted to be linear but, in principle, it is possible to tax diﬀerently groups that
have diﬀerent observable characteristics (such as age, marital status, rural or urban
residence, etc.). We study under what conditions it is optimal to deny local governments
the possibility to impose diﬀerent tax schedules on diﬀerent groups.
Our crucial assumption is that, at the local level, tax setting is not driven by
pure social welfare maximization. Instead, various groups of taxpayers exert political
pressure, by means of lobbying activities, with the aim of gaining a more favorable
tax treatment. When lobbying groups successfully inﬂuence the policy maker choices,
the resulting tax policy is distorted away from the social optimum, provided that the
opposing parties do not oﬀset each other in their attempts to gain inﬂuence. Even when
the battle for gaining political inﬂuence does not distort the tax structure, ineﬃciencies
arise because of the resources that are wasted in lobbying. In this setting it is clearly
1For a comprehensive survey on tax assignment in federations, see Ambrosanio and Bordignon [1].
2This notion of ﬁscal autonomy is related to the problem of soft-budget constraints of local govern-
ments. See Rodden, Eskeland and Litvack [20] for a collection of contributions on this topic.
3Although the traditional normative literature on ﬁscal federalism (Musgrave [17]) only attributes
an allocative role to local governments, it appears that in practice the latter also have important
redistributive functions both on the revenue raising and on the expenditure side of their budget (see,
e.g., Daﬄon [7], and Boadway [4]).
4Local governments may have better information on the characteristics of the tax base, and it may
t h e r e f o r eb ee ﬃcient for the central government to delegate taxing power on this tax base to local
governments.
2possible that restricting the set of the available tax instruments — i.e., restricting the
degree of tax autonomy — is welfare improving.
We ﬁnd indeed that there are circumstances in which one may want to limit the
tax autonomy of local governments. In general, a restriction of tax autonomy may be
desirable when the policy maker is easily inﬂuenced by lobbying groups. The result
hinges on the diﬀerent incentives for lobbying arising under the assumption of diﬀerent
degrees of tax autonomy. With a high level of tax autonomy, the set of tax instruments
is large, and therefore each lobbying group can target in a separate manner its own tax
rates and subsidies and the other groups’ tax rates and subsidies, with the result that
lobbying is eﬀective in distorting tax policy. We show that under full tax autonomy
the lobbying activity concentrates on group-speciﬁc subsidies, while tax rates are used
to redistribute income inside groups. On the contrary, when tax autonomy is minimal,
all tax instruments aﬀect the members of all groups, thereby reducing the distortionary
impact of lobbying.
When tax autonomy is large, relatively small groups have higher incentives to lobby
and therefore also have higher ‘size-adjusted’ political inﬂuence than relatively large
groups. Instead, when tax autonomy is restricted, the incentives to lobby are stronger
the greater is the distance of the group’s average tax base from the overall average
tax base and the larger is the group size. In particular, groups with an average tax
base equal to the overall average have no incentive to lobby. The key message of the
paper is that restricting tax autonomy is likely to be social welfare improving whenever
the diﬀerent groups of taxpayers have similar size, whereas enlarging tax autonomy is
welfare improving whenever tax bases are asymmetrically distributed.
We also ﬁnd that limiting the tax autonomy of the local government may distort
the supply of the local public good away from its optimal level. Both under and
over provision may occur, depending on whether restricting tax autonomy increases or
reduces the social marginal cost in terms of inequality of public good provision.
T h el i t e r a t u r eo nﬁscal federalism has identiﬁed and examined other reasons for
limiting the tax autonomy of local governments.5 These include eﬃciency arguments,
like tax competition among governments belonging to the same layer, which gives rise
to horizontal tax externalities (see, e.g., Wilson [24] and Zodrow and Mieszkowski [25])
and tax competition between diﬀerent layers of government sharing the same tax base,
which gives rise to vertical tax externalities (Keen [15], Keen and Kotsogiannis [16] and
Dahlby and Wilson [8]).
5T h el i t e r a t u r eo ﬀers also arguments in favor of ﬁscal autonomy. The classical argument (see, e.g.,
Tiebout [21]; Brennan and Buchanan, [6]) is that ﬁscal autonomy promotes competition among local
governments that hinders their tendency to act as Leviathan revenue maximizers.
3A recent and growing body of research, belonging to the so-called ‘second generation
theory of ﬁscal federalism’ (Oates [18]), focuses on the role of political institutions
in federal settings. Although a strand of the research investigates how the lobbying
activities of special interest groups aﬀect various aspects of public policies, none has
yet addressed the issue on which we focus in this paper. For instance, Persson [19]
introduces lobbying by special interest groups in a typical common pool problem, in
which there is tax base sharing among local governments. Bardhan and Mookherjee
[2] examine lobbying by special interest groups aimed at inﬂuencing the outcomes of
local elections. Bordignon, Colombo and Galmarini [5] focus on the role of lobbying
on the choice between centralization and decentralization of public policies.6 Finally,
Esteller-Moré, Galmarini and Rizzo [10] examine the issue of vertical tax externalities
between upper and lower layers of government in a setting in which taxpayers lobby
the policy makers for tax reductions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is set up in section 2,
where we specify the types of tax structures available to the local government and the
process leading to tax setting as a result of the interplay between the policy maker and
the taxpayers organized in lobbying groups. In sections 3 and 4 we examine the ﬁscal
policies that emerge under the two polar tax environments, respectively labeled Full
Tax Autonomy (FTA) and Minimal Tax Autonomy (MTA). The comparison of public
good supply under the two tax regimes is given in section 5. Section 6 compares FTA
and MTA, characterizing the cases in which MTA is welfare superior to FTA. Finally,
section 7 concludes illustrating avenues for future research. An appendix contains all
the proofs.
2 A Model of Local Fiscal Policy
We consider a local jurisdiction (or, shortly, a ‘region’) with a population partitioned
into J groups according to some observable characteristics (e.g., source of income,
residence, family status, and so on). Group j has mass θj ∈ (0,1),w i t h
PJ
j=1 θj =1 .
There is heterogeneity inside groups but the members of each group have to be treated
uniformly by the ﬁscal policy. The type of each agent is given by a triplet (β,B,γ),
where β denotes the net income (gross income net of central government taxation) of
6In Bordignon, Colombo and Galmarini [5] lobbying behavior is modeled using the ‘buying inﬂuence’
approach of the ‘common agency’ games developed by Dixit, Grossman and Helpman [9] and Grossman
and Helpman [11], [12]. In this paper, analytical tractability forces us to use a simpler model of lobbying
behavior in the spirit of Becker [3] that can be interpreted as a reduced form of the common agency
models.
4the agent, B is the tax base on which the local government can levy a tax, and γ is the
unit beneﬁt the agent receives from the public good provided by the local government.
As an example, B may be the value of the real estate held by the agent in the region.7
We assume that, by law, the local government can only use B as its tax base. We also
assume that γ is private information.
In each group j the distribution of types is given by the known density fj (β,B,γ)
on the set R3
+. Denoting with Ej [g (x)] the expected value of g (x) for group j,l e t
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We assume that, in expected terms, taxpayers with a high (resp. low) income β also
have a high (resp. low) local tax base B. This is a natural assumption when, for
example, we interpret B as the value of real estate held in the region.
Assumption 1 (i) For each group j, the distribution fj is such that covj (β,B) > 0.







For each group j and for each variable the variance is strictly positive.
Let G be the supply of the public good. If G units are produced then an agent of type
(β,B,γ) receives a beneﬁt γG, and the cost of public good provision for the community
is G. We assume that in each group j the average beneﬁt γj of the public good is higher
than the constant marginal cost of production.
Assumption 2 γj > 1 for each group j.
Notice that this implies
PJ
j=1 θjγj = γ>1. We do not make assumptions about
the relation, in expected terms, between beneﬁts γ and the tax base B or net income
β, since both positive and negative correlations are possible in practice.8 The policy
7Our formulation is compatible with a situation in which B = αβ for some α ∈ [0,1]; i.e., local
governments can levy taxes on (part of) the residents’ income.
8For instance, in the case of ﬁre and police protection, those with higher property values and incomes
have more to beneﬁt from public expenditure. The correlation is instead negative if, for instance, G
is interpreted as public schooling and rich households are more likely to send their children to private
schools.
5maker is only allowed to levy group-speciﬁc linear taxes on B,w i t ht a xr a t etj and a
lump sum subsidy Sj (the lump sum component can be either positive or negative).
Denote by t =( t1,...,t J) the vector of tax rates and by S =( S1,...,S J) the vector
of subsidies. For type (β,B,γ) of group j the net utility when G units of public good
are produced is







= Ej [u]=γjG + βj − tjBj + Sj (2)









θjuj = γG+ β − T + S (3)




















θjvarj (u)+v a r( uj) (4)
be the variance of net utilities, which is composed of the within-groups variance,
PJ
j=1 θjvarj (u), and the between-groups variance, var (uj).
We ﬁrst consider the determination of taxes and subsidies taking the level of public
expenditure G as given. Our assumption is that taxes and subsidies are determined
through a lobbying game, and the outcome can be described in reduced form as the




qjuj − rvar (u),( 5 )
where
qj = θj (1 + m(pj − p)),( 6 )
and where m ≥ 0 is a parameter capturing the sensitivity of the policy maker to






j=1 θjuj (average utilities) and −rvar (u) (minus the variance of utili-
ties) in (5) are relatively standard and can be thought as coming from a concave social
welfare function, with r>0 determining the level of inequality aversion. However,
the weight, qj, given to group j is not determined purely by its size but also by its
relative political clout, as reﬂected by the lobbying weight m(pj − p).T h ec o e ﬃcient
of political inﬂuence for group j,d e n o t e db ypj, will eventually be made endogenous,
and it depends on the average lobbying eﬀort by members of group j. At this stage,
however, we take the coeﬃcients pj as given.
We do not allow for debt, so that the tax and subsidy policy (t,S) has to satisfy
the budget constraint
G = T − S.( 7 )
If public expenditure is given, then the tax and subsidy policy is obtained solving
max
t,S
V (t,S,G) s.t. (7). (8)
We want to analyze the welfare eﬀects of the following two tax regimes.
• Full Tax Autonomy (FTA): the policy maker is free to set diﬀerent tax rates tj
and subsidies Sj for diﬀerent groups.
• Minimal Tax Autonomy (MTA): the policy maker is forced to treat all groups
homogeneously. In other words, the decision maker can only choose a pair (t,S)
a n dt h e ns e ttj = t, Sj = S for each group j.
Intermediate cases are also possible, such as those in which tax schedules can vary only
within a certain range. In this paper our goal is to identify the eﬀect on welfare of
a restriction of tax autonomy, so we limit our attention to the two extreme cases. A
more complete analysis would include a discussion of the exact degree and format of
tax autonomy that maximizes social welfare.9
3 Full Tax Autonomy
We consider a three-stage game. In stage 1, the policy maker sets public expenditure.
In stage 2, given public expenditure, taxpayers exert political inﬂuence on their local
9Immonen, Kanbur, Keen and Tuomala [14] and Viard [22] examine the optimal diﬀerentiation
of (non-linear) income tax schedules among sub-groups of taxpayers in a classical optimal taxation
framework, with endogenous labor supply and a benevolent policy maker that maximizes a social
welfare function. The complexity of tax systems has also been investigated by Hettich and Winer [13]
and Warskett, Winer, and Hettich [23] in a probabilistic voting framework.
7policy maker. In stage 3, tax policy is determined as outlined above. The model is
solved by backward induction.
3.1 Taxes and Subsidies under FTA
At stage 3, taking as given G and pj, j =1 ,...,J, the policy maker solves program
(8). The result is given in the following proposition.





















(pj − p), (10)
respectively.
The logic of the result is simple. In our framework taxes have no adverse eﬀect on the
income produced. If the planner could observe the type of each agent and establish
individual transfers then one simple way to solve program (8) would be to assign lump-
sum individual-speciﬁc subsidies. In fact, since the planner is inequality-averse, a simple
solution is to conﬁscate entirely the income, ﬁnance the production of the public good
and then redistribute the remaining tax revenue compensating those who have a lower
preference for the public good. For a type (γ,β,B) this would lead to a personalized
tax t(γ,β,B)=β/B, for a total tax revenue of β, and a personalized subsidy
S (γ,β,B)=β − G − (γ − γ)G,
where the ﬁrst term is the total tax revenue, G i st h ea m o u n tt ob eﬁnanced and the
term −(γ − γ)G compensates those who have low utility from the public good.
However, the planner does not observe the individual types but only the distribution
they are drawn from, i.e. the group j t ow h i c ht h e yb e l o n g . 10 This leads to higher
subsidies for those groups with below-average income and below-average preference for
the public good. Since we allow for negative values of Sj, in principle all the subsidies
could be ﬁnanced via lump sum taxes, but a non-zero tax rate tj c a nb eu s e dt or e d u c e
intra-group inequality. In fact, notice that if γ, β and B were independent, so that
10More precisely, γ is not observed and β is not taxable at the local level, so that taxes can not be
made contingent on γ and β at the individual level.
8covj (β,B)=c o v j (γ,B)=0 , then the optimal tax rate would be zero.11 But when
there is correlation then group-speciﬁct a xr a t e sc a nb eu s e dt od e c r e a s et h ev a r i a b i l i t y
of utility inside the group. If covj (β,B) > 0 and covj (γ,B) > 0 then individuals
with a higher local tax base B enjoy on average both a higher income β and a higher
utility from the public good γ. Setting a positive tax rate and then distributing the tax
revenue as a lump sum subsidy decreases the inside-group variance. As observed, the
job of t∗
j is to redistribute income inside group j, so that the political power of group
j versus the other groups is irrelevant.
Considerations of relative political power are instead important in determining the
lump—sum subsidy or tax S∗∗
j . In fact, the subsidy to group j tends to equalize utility
across groups, much in the same way as individual lump—sum taxes and subsidies would
do. Thus, the subsidy compensates groups with lower than average taste for the public
good (γj < γ) and lower than average income (βj < β) .T h el a s tt e r mi n( 1 0 ) ,w h i c h











=( γ − 1)G + β +
m
2r
(pj − p). (11)
This shows that the only source of between-groups inequality is the presence of non-












This is intuitive. With inequality aversion a benevolent planner would equalize the
average utility of all groups. It is only the presence of diﬀerential political power that
leads to diﬀerences across groups.
3.2 Political Support under FTA
The analysis up to now has taken the political weights pj as given. We now endogenize






for group j. Since the marginal tax rate t∗
j does not depend on pj we can ignore it in
the analysis. Thus, taking as given G and the lobbying weights of groups other than









11This does not mean that group j does not pay taxes, since S
∗∗
j could be negative.
9where S∗∗





(1 − θj). (15)












where b θ =
PJ
j=1 θ2
j can be interpreted as the ‘average mass’ of the groups.12 This
implies
p∗FTA




b θ − θj
´
.
Notice that groups choose independently and simultaneously their own lobbying eﬀort
and that the resulting Nash equilibrium is in dominant strategies. Groups with a below-
average mass have an above-average political inﬂuence. This follows from the fact that
a given amount of lobbying eﬀort exerted by a ‘small’ group j is more productive in
terms of political inﬂuence than an identical amount of eﬀort exerted by a ‘big’ group,
since the small group has a negligible impact on average political inﬂuence. Notice also
that the average level of lobbying p∗FTA is decreasing in the average mass of groups
b θ. Therefore, when the groups are approximately of equal size, the lobbying activity is
more intense than in the case in which the groups are asymmetric in size.
Substituting for p∗FTA
j and p∗FTA into (10), the subsidy to group j becomes
S∗
j (G)=t∗
















Observe that in the case of equally sized groups we have b θ = θj =1 /J,s ol o b b y i n g
has no distortionary eﬀect. It remains true however that the level of lobbying is at its
highest level, and this is a social cost.
3.3 Public Good Supply under FTA
Finally, consider stage 1. At this stage, a benevolent planner sets the level of public
expenditure G knowing that taxes and subsidies will be determined according to the

















12The index b θ reaches the lowest level of 1/J when the population is equally distributed among the
J groups and the highest level of 1 when the population is concentrated in one group.
13We assume that citizens do not try to inﬂuence the choice of G, and therefore the policy maker
computes average welfare (the ﬁrst term in expression 17) using the ‘true’ weights, θj, instead of the
10We have the following result.
Proposition 2 Under full tax autonomy the level of the public good which maximizes
social welfare is given by
G∗FTA =

















The ﬁrst thing to notice is that public good supply is not distorted. Under full tax
autonomy there are no restrictions on ﬁscal instruments and this makes sure that
political redistribution only aﬀects subsidies, and the amount of extra subsidy that a
group can obtain by increasing its lobbying eﬀort is independent of the level of the
public good.
As r → 0, so that the social planner does not care about distribution, the optimal
level of public expenditure goes to inﬁnity (or, more realistically, it is pushed to the
maximum feasible level). This is a consequence of the fact that we have assumed a
constant marginal expected beneﬁt and a constant marginal cost of production for
the public good, with the average marginal beneﬁt greater than the marginal cost.
When r>0, it remains true that G∗FTA is higher the larger is the diﬀerence between
the average beneﬁts γ and the marginal cost. To understand the other parts of the
formula, suppose ﬁrst that covj (γ,β)=c o v j (γ,B)=0for each j. In that case, the
level of the public good is a simple decreasing function of the within-groups variance
of γ. This follows from the fact that an increase of G increases the variance of the
utilities, as it beneﬁts disproportionately those with a higher γ.
With non-zero covariances an additional eﬀect comes into play. When covj (γ,B) >
0, those who obtain a higher utility from the public good also end up paying more taxes.
T h i sr e d u c e st h ei m p a c to ni n e q u a l i t yo fa ni n c r e a s eo fG, thus leading to an higher
optimal level of the public good. The eﬀect is weighted by
covj (β,B)
varj (B)
,w h i c hc a nb e
thought as the degree of linear dependence between β and B. On the other hand,
having covj (γ,β) > 0 reduces the optimal level of the public good. The reason is that
β is not taxed at the local level, so increasing G ends up giving more utility to those











. However, G is chosen taking into account
that the decisions about taxes and subsidies will be distorted by the lobbying eﬀort. We also notice
that under FTA the optimal G is not aﬀected by the type of weights used to compute average welfare
in the objective function (17).
114 Minimal Tax Autonomy
In this section we consider the case in which the center imposes a ‘no discrimination
among groups’ rule, thus restricting the tax autonomy of the sub-national government.
This implies that tax rates and subsidies have to be the same across groups, i.e. tj = t
and Sj = S for each j.
4.1 Taxes and Subsidies under MTA
Under the ‘no discrimination’ rule, the utility of type (β,B,γ) is independent of the
group j.W eh a v e












= γG+ β − tB + S.
Given that









the variance of the utilities is equal to
var (u)=G2var (γ)+var(β)+t2var (B)+2(Gcov(γ,β) − tGcov(γ,B) − tcov(β,B)).







γjG + βj − tBj + S
¢
− rvar (u) s.t. G = tB − S. (20)
Solving problem (20) we obtain the following result.
Proposition 3 Under minimal tax autonomy, the optimal tax and subsidy for all



































12To understand Proposition 3 consider ﬁrst the case in which the decision is not distorted




=0 . In that case, the tax rate (21) is similar to the
one we found for the case of full tax autonomy. Of course, since the tax rate is the same
a c r o s sg r o u p s ,w eh a v et ou s et h ed i s t r ibution for the overall population f =
PJ
j=1 θjfj
rather than the group-speciﬁc distributions fj. Other than that, the principles behind
the determination of the tax rate are the same. Notice that if the local tax base B
is not correlated to either β or γ then the optimal tax rate is t =0 . In turn, this
implies that S = −G, so that the public good is ﬁnanced through a lump-sum tax
equal for all citizens. Instead, when cov(β,B) > 0, the planner sets a positive tax rate
since those who end up paying the tax are also on average the ones who have a higher
income β. Thus, a positive tax rate reduces inequality. A similar reasoning applies
when cov(γ,B) > 0.
When political distortion is added the tax rate changes. This is an important
diﬀerence with the case of full tax autonomy, as in that case lobbying only inﬂuences





< 0, then the marginal tax rate tends to be higher than in the absence
of political inﬂuence. The reason is that in this case the tendency of the government
to distribute taxes from rich to poor groups is strengthened by the additional weight












so that the political weight pj aﬀects the marginal tax rate in a diﬀerent way depending
on whether the average tax base of group j is below or above the average tax base for
the whole population. If the average taxpayer of group j is ‘poor’, so that Bj < B,
then an increase in its political inﬂuence determines an increase in the progressiveness
of the tax schedule, by increasing both the marginal tax rate and the lump sum subsidy.
T h eo p p o s i t ee ﬀect holds for a group in which the average taxpayer has a higher-than-
average tax base (i.e., Bj > B).
4.2 Political Support under MTA
In stage 2, taking as given G and the political support of other groups, the lobby group
j chooses its political support pj to minimize the sum of tax liabilities and costs of
lobbying, i.e.
t∗∗(p,G)Bj − S∗∗(p,G)+c(pj).






























Thus, the amount of lobbying eﬀort depends on the size of the group and on the
distance between the average local tax base of the group and the average local tax base
of the region. Clearly, given that under a uniform linear tax a balanced-budget increase
in the marginal tax rate redistributes from individuals with above-average tax base
to individuals with below-average tax base, the incentive to exert eﬀort for political
inﬂuence becomes larger the greater is the distance of the group’s average tax base
from the average regional tax base.





















Under MTA, both the within-groups variance and the between-groups variance may be
distorted by political inﬂuence. A group’s political inﬂuence is related to the distance of
the group’s average tax base from the mean tax base of the entire population. Notice
also that a high level of political inﬂuence is not necessarily associated to a more
favorable tax treatment, since there may be an opposing group (on the other side of
the average tax base) that succeeds in pulling the tax rate in the opposite direction.
4.3 Public Good Supply under MTA





j − rvar (u∗). (25)
The optimal public good supply is given in the following proposition.
14Proposition 4 Under minimal tax autonomy the level of the public good which maxi-
mizes social welfare is
G∗MTA =













Expression (26) for public good provision under MTA has an identical structure to
the corresponding expression (18) under FTA. The diﬀerence is that the formula under
FTA contains only within-groups variances and covariances, whereas the formula under
MTA contains total variances and covariances (within-groups plus between-groups). In
general, therefore, the optimal G under MTA is diﬀerent from the one under FTA, as
we discuss in the next section.
Remark. Similarly to the FTA case, also under MTA political support does not
aﬀect the choice of public good supply. Notice however that this is a consequence
of the assumption that the policy maker computes average welfare using the ‘correct’









were used, then the optimal public good supply would
be




















Thus, the lobbying weights p∗MTA
j would inﬂuence also public good supply. In partic-
ular, public good provision would be higher, ceteris paribus, if the groups that beneﬁt





> 0.M o r e o v e r ,




then public good provision is lower when richer groups are more inﬂuential, since the
progressivity of the tax makes them pay a price for the public good that is larger than
the average cost.
5 Tax Regimes and Public Good Supply
As already noted, the amount of public good supplied under FTA is not inﬂuenced by
the possibility of lobbying. In a way, G∗FTA is the undistorted supply of the public good
that a benevolent central planner would provide in the case in which lobbying were not
present. On the contrary, under MTA the supply of the public good is distorted with
15respect to the case of unrestricted ﬁscal instruments. In this section we investigate
under which conditions MTA leads to under-provision or over-provision in the level of
the public good with respect to the benchmark level G∗FTA.
In general, the diﬀerence between G∗FTA and G∗MTA is hard to sign, since many
parameters are at play. However, something can be said in special cases. One such
case is the one in which γ, the beneﬁt from public good provision, is uncorrelated with
the income β and the tax base B, both within and between groups.


















In the presence of heterogeneous beneﬁts γ u n c o r r e l a t e db o t hw i t hn e ti n c o m eβ and tax
base B, an increase in public good provision increases the variance of individual utilities
under both tax regimes. However, the impact on inequality of a marginal increase in G
is greater under MTA than under FTA. In fact, under FTA the diﬀerentiated subsidies
S∗
j (see expression (16)), are contingent on the distance between the group average
beneﬁt, γj, and the population average beneﬁt, γ, a correction that is not possible
with the uniform subsidy under MTA.
The result in Proposition 5 hinges on somewhat restrictive assumptions. In order
to examine the issue of public good provision when this assumption is relaxed, consider
the following speciﬁcation of the joint distribution of the variables β, B and γ.
Assumption 3 In each group j the distribution of B is given by the density fj(B) on
R+,w i t hm e a nBj and variance varj (B). For each member of the group with value
B, the values of (β,γ) are obtained as realizations of the random variables e βj and e γj
which can be written as
e βj = b0j + bB + ε, e γj = g0j + gB + ξ,
where b0j, b, g0j and g are non-negative parameters; ε and ξ are random variables with
zero mean and variance var (ε) and var (ξ) for all j,a n dcovj (B,ε)=c o v j (B,ξ)=
cov(ε,ξ)=0for all j.
Assumption (3) implies that the within groups variance is uniform and that, in expected
terms, the marginal impact of an increase in the tax base B on income β and beneﬁts
γ is constant and uniform across groups, i.e.
∂Ej[βj|B]
∂B = b and
∂Ej[γj|B]
∂B = g for all j.
16However, this speciﬁcation allows for between groups heterogeneity in terms of average























,v a r (g0j)=
J X
j=1
θj (g0j − g)
2
When Assumption 3 holds, we have




What happens is that both γ and β depend linearly on B. Remember that the social
planner is reluctant to increase the level of the public good when covj (γ,β) > 0 because
this increases inequality. On the other hand, if covj (γ,B) > 0 then the inequality can
be reduced by taxing more those that, on average, obtain a higher utility from the
public good. This eﬀect is reinforced when covj (β,B) > 0, since in that case local
taxes are paid more, on average, by those who have higher income. Under Assumption











+v a r( ξ)
for each j.
The expression for G∗MTA is more complicated since intergroup heterogeneity enters
into the picture. When Assumption 3 holds, it becomes
G∗MTA =























We collect these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 If Assumption 3 holds then the values of G∗FTA and G∗MTA are given
by (27) and (28), respectively.

















¢ ≥ 0,s i n c evar (B)=
PJ





This implies that the denominator of G∗MTA in (28) is always greater than or equal to
that of G∗FTA in (27). The reason is simple and it is that the variability in γ,w h i c h
pushes the optimal level of G downward because the planner does not like inequality,
cannot be compensated by diﬀerential taxation of diﬀerent groups under MTA, while it
can do so under FTA. This eﬀect is analogous to the one we discussed after Proposition
5 and it tends to make G∗MTA lower than G∗FTA, i.e. the public good tends to be under-
provided when MTA is adopted.
At this point, we can state the following corollary to Proposition (6).












then G∗MTA <G ∗FTA.F u r t h e r m o r e
(a) If g0j = g0 for all j,t h e nG∗MTA = G∗FTA.




var(ξ) ,t h e nG∗MTA >G ∗FTA.
We have already explained why in general we expect G∗MTA to be lower than G∗FTA.
Essentially, under MTA we care about the inter-group variance of γ (since compensatory
taxation is not possible) while under FTA we can ignore that. We can have G∗MTA >
G∗FTA only if this basic force is countered by something else. Inter-group heterogeneity
has to be such that an increase in the public good can decrease the inequality. The
factors that determine whether this is possible or not are the inter-group covariance
between γ and β (summarized by cov(g0j,b 0j)) and the inter-group covariances between









When inequality (29) holds, no such countervailing force is present. In fact, what
happens is that across groups the link between γ and β adds to inequality (when G is
increased) and it is not compensated by the increase in taxation for those who have









=0and inequality (29) becomes simply cov(g0j,b 0j) > 0.T h i si st h ec a s e
in which there is no inter-group variation in average taxation. In this case the positive
correlation across groups of β and γ implies an increase in inequality whenever G is
increased. This pushes the optimal level of G∗MTA downward.
The situation G∗MTA >G ∗FTA can only arise if inequality (29) does not hold and in











18to compensate for the inter-group variance of γ, which makes the denominator larger for
G∗MTA than G∗FTA. Again, the simplest case is the one in which there is no inter-group
v a r i a t i o ni na v e r a g ei n c o m e( Bj = B for all j), so that egalitarian intervention through
the tax rate t is not possible. In that case, a necessary condition for G∗MTA >G ∗FTA
is cov(g0j,b 0j) < 0, meaning that richer people on average like less the public good.
Thus, increasing the level of the public good decreases inequality. When the eﬀect is




var(ξ) ), the optimal level of G is higher under
MTA than under FTA.
6C o m p a r i n g T a x R e g i m e s
When m =0it is clear that there is no lobbying eﬀort under both tax regimes, so
that the policy maker maximizes average social welfare computed using the weights θj.
Concerning tax policy, for any given level of public good supply, FTA does weakly better
than MTA simply because the constraint set is larger. The computations above show
that in fact under FTA the additional ﬂexibility is exploited, thus FTA does strictly
better than MTA. Moreover, public good supply, which is independent of lobbying
eﬀort under both tax regimes, is optimally set under FTA whereas it may be distorted
under MTA.
When m>0, political competition among groups is the source of two types of
social welfare losses: distortions in tax policy and wasteful lobbying eﬀort. Deﬁne the

























where u∗FTA = γG∗FTA + β − t∗
jB + S∗
j, u∗MTA = γG∗MTA + β − t∗B + S∗.























The two tax regimes can then be compared by looking at social welfare net of the cost
of lobbying. In particular, notice that all we have to do is to examine how net social
welfare,
W∗FTA
net (m)=W∗FTA(m) − C∗FTA(m), W∗MTA
net (m)=W∗MTA(m) − C∗MTA(m),
19is aﬀected by the the value of m, which represents the importance attached by the
policy maker to the pressure exerted by the lobbying groups for inﬂuencing tax policy.
Concerning the partial derivatives of net social welfare with respect to m,w ec a np r o v e
the following result.
Proposition 7 The parameter m aﬀects net social welfare, respectively under FTA













































In these expressions, the ﬁrst term shows how an increase in m, by distorting tax
policy, inﬂuences gross social welfare; in particular, the tax distortion aﬀects only the
equity term of social welfare (i.e., the variance of utilities) since the average of utilities
is independent of m. The second term in expressions (30)—(31) reﬂects instead the
impact of an increase in m on the aggregate cost of the lobbying eﬀort.
Proposition 7 makes clear that under FTA the cost of distortionary lobbying is
mostly related to the variation in group size, while under MTA the inter-group distri-
bution of the average tax bases, Bj, becomes important. Neither the distribution of
public good beneﬁts and that of net income — nor the correlations between tax bases,
beneﬁts, and income — play a role in how net social welfare responds to changes in m.
Observe now that W∗FTA(0) >W ∗MTA(0) and C∗FTA(0) = C∗FTA(0) = 0.S i n c e
net social welfare is continuous in m, the implication is that for small values of m FTA
remains superior to MTA. What happens when m becomes large depends on the value





























































=3 a1m2 + a2.
We thus obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 2 If a1 < 0 then there is a unique value m∗ > 0 such that W∗FTA
net (m) >
W∗MTA
net (m) for m<m ∗ and W∗FTA
net (m) <W ∗MTA
net (m) for m>m ∗.T h e s a m e
conclusion holds when a1 =0and a2 < 0.
By inspection, it is clear that the condition a1 < 0 is more likely to hold when
inter-group variability in the average tax base is low and the variability in size is large.






> 0, it will hold whenever Bj = B for each
j or, more in general, when
¯ ¯Bj − B
¯ ¯ <εfor each j and for some suﬃciently small ε.
To better understand the content of Corollary 2, we look at two examples. In the
ﬁrst, we consider distributions of the groups’ average tax base, Bj, that are uniform
and symmetric. In the second, we consider the case J =2 .
Example 1. Equally sized groups with pairwise symmetric tax bases.C o n -
sider a situation in which there are J ≥ 2 groups, of weight θj = 1
J each. Average tax
bases are given by Bj = ωj,f o rs o m eω>0. Thus, average tax bases are pairwise
symmetric around the mean, B =
(J+1)ω















so that a1 =0 . Thus, there will be a ‘crossing point’ m∗ i fa n do n l yi fa2 < 0,o r
J X
j=1










When θj = 1
J for each j this can be written as




















Thus, a suﬃcient condition for inequality (32) to hold is
















































It can be checked that the inequality is in fact satisﬁed for each integer J ≥ 2.
The assumption that all groups have equal weight implies that under FTA all groups
exert the same amount of lobbying, i.e. p∗FTA
j = p∗FTA for all j, which implies that
tax policy is not distorted. Tax policy is also not distorted under MTA, since uniform






expression of the uniform marginal tax rate. The comparison between FTA and MTA
thus depends only on the cost of lobbying, and the result is that the latter increases
more sharply under FTA than under MTA as m increases.
Example 2. Two groups. Consider now the case in which there are two groups,
j =1 ,2.I f θ1 = θ2 = 1
2 then this is just a special case of Example 1, and the same
conclusions apply. Thus, suppose that the two groups are asymmetric; i.e. θ1 6= θ2,




= θ(1 − θ)∆2.
Let also Φ =
P2





θ4 (1 − θ)
4 (1 − 2θ)
2 ∆6
(θ(1 − θ)∆2 + Φ)
3 − θ(1 − θ)(1− 2θ)
2
!
It is immediate to check that a1 =0when Φ =0 . Thus, for any strictly positive Φ we
have a1 < 0. We conclude that in this case there is always a value m∗ such that FTA
dominates MTA when m<m ∗ and the reverse is true if m>m ∗.
7 Concluding remarks
In many countries central governments delegate to local governments expenditure func-
tions and, to some degree, the power to tax. While the debate on expenditure assign-
m e n t sh a sf o c u s e db o t ho ne ﬃciency and equity issues — and thus on the social impact
of local public good spillovers and on the deﬁnition and implementation of mechanisms
guaranteeing minimum uniform levels of expenditure across regions — that on tax as-
signment has mainly concentrated on the eﬃciency aspects of decentralization, such as
tax competition and tax exporting.
22This paper focuses on yet another aspect of ﬁscal decentralization, namely the wel-
fare implications of tax autonomy when local governments are subject to the pressure
of local interest groups. In fact, while the proximity of local policy makers to their
constituencies may allow a better ﬁt between ﬁscal policies and local preferences and
needs, it may also increase the likelihood that the policy makers may end up being
captured by lobbies, hence distorting ﬁscal policies. In a simple theoretical framework,
we have shown that restricting the degree of tax autonomy may be welfare improving
whenever the inﬂuence of lobbies becomes suﬃciently large. In particular, our analysis
shows that restricting tax autonomy is more likely to be beneﬁcial when the diﬀerent
groups have similar average tax bases and when the groups are asymmetric in size.
Analytical tractability induced us to make some simplifying assumptions raising
issues that need to be addressed in future research. A few are worth mentioning, al-
though for the most part they would greatly complicate the structure of the model
without undermining its main conclusions. First, the income tax policy of the cen-
tral government has been taken as given. It is left for future research to address the
implications for tax autonomy of the interplay between the upper and lower layers of
government tax policies, as well as the implications of lobbying both at the central and
at the local level. A second and conceptually more demanding extension would be to
explicitly model the extensive form of the lobbying game between the taxpayers and
the policy makers, which is taken as a reduced form in the present version of the paper.
This may provide a better understanding of the incentives to lobby under diﬀerent tax
regimes, which in turn may be important in designing the optimal structure of the tax
system.
23Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . Using (1), (2), (3) and (7), observe that




G +( β − βj) − tj(B − Bj),




G +( βj − β) − (tjBj − Sj),















θj (Gcovj (γ,β) − tjGcovj (γ,B) − tjcovj (β,B)), (34)










G +( βj − β) − (tjBj − Sj)
¢2
. (35)
The objective function is concave and the constraint set is convex. Thus, the solution







θjvarj (u) − rvar (uj) − μ
¡
G − T + S
¢
. (36)
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to Sj is
∂L
∂Sj






G +( βj − β) − (tjBj − Sj)
¢
− μθj =0 , (37)










=0into (38), we obtain the expression for t∗
j g i v e ni nt h e
proposition. Summing the ﬁrst order conditions (37) over j and using the budget con-
s t r a i n tw eg e tμ =1 . Substituting into (37) and solving for Sj, we obtain the formula
given in the proposition.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . Under the optimal tax policy derived above, the average
utility of members of group j is equal to:
u∗









































Gcovj (γ,β) − t∗




Thus the policy maker sets G to maximize V (G) deﬁned in (17). After some algebra,
the ﬁrst order condition can be written as
































holds, the optimal level of public good is the one given in the proposition.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .L e tμ be the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint.
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to S yields μ =1 . It follows that the ﬁrst order
condition with respect to t is
J X
j=1
(θj − qj)Bj − 2r(t var (B) − Gcov(γ,B) − cov(β,B)) = 0.
Using θj −qj = −mθj (pj − p) we obtain the formula for t∗∗ in the proposition. Substi-
tuting into the ﬁrst order condition for S we obtain the formula for the optimal subsidy.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . Under the chosen tax policy, the average utility of members










25and the variance of utilities is
var (u∗)=G2var (γ)+v a r( β)+( t∗)
2 var (B)+















The ﬁrst order condition for maximizing (25) with respect to G is














var (B) − cov(γ,B)
¶





























var(B) > 0 by the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, the ﬁrst order
condition is necessary and suﬃcient. Thus we obtain the value G∗MTA s h o w ni n( 2 6 ) .
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof follows immediately from expressions (18) and








P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 .O b s e r v eﬁrst that under Assumption 3, for each group j,
we have
varj (γ)=g2varj (B)+v a r( ξ), covj (β,B)=bvarj (B),
covj (γ,B)=gvarj (B), covj (γ,β)=gbvarj (B).
Recalling that var(x)=
PJ







, for the entire population we obtain
























26The claim of the proposition follows by substituting the above expressions into equa-
tions (18) and (26).
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y1 . Inequality (29) implies immediately that G∗MTA <G ∗FTA.




=v a r ( g0j)=0 ; hence, the ﬁrst
statement follows immediately. The second and the third statements of the corollary




=0 ,a n d
therefore, by comparing expressions (27) and (28), one gets






which proves the result.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 . Observe that under both tax regimes, average social welfare,
u∗FTA =( γ − 1)G∗FTA + β, u∗MTA =( γ − 1)G∗MTA + β,
is independent of m. Only the variance of utilities and the cost of lobbying are functions
of m.



































































θj (1 − θj)
2 ,




we get the second term in (30).






















































By substituting for t∗ and ∂t∗


















so that by multiplying this latter expression by r we get the ﬁrst term in (31). Finally


























, we get the second term in (31).
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y2 .W h e n a1 < 0 and a2 < 0 as well, then the diﬀerence
W∗FTA
net (m) − W∗MTA
net (m) is always decreasing and it goes to −∞ as m → +∞.S i n c e
the diﬀerence is positive at m =0the conclusion of the corollary follows.
When a1 < 0 and a2 > 0 then the diﬀerence W∗FTA
net (m) − W∗MTA
net (m) is initially
increasing and it reaches a maximum at m∗ =
q
−a2
a1. After that the diﬀerence declines
and at some point MTA becomes better than FTA.
Finally, if a1 =0then the diﬀerence W∗FTA
net (m)−W∗MTA
net (m) is a quadratic func-
tion of m,w i t ha2 the coeﬃcient of m2.I f a2 < 0, the function is concave and the
conclusion follows.
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